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DUE PROCESS AND PREJUDGMENT
ATTACHMENT IN CALIFORNIA
Because John Smith had sufficient reason to believe that he had
been the victim of fraud in the purchase of a new car he refused
to make further payments. It was not long before he was served
with summons in an action demanding the balance due on the install-
ment payment contract. But along with the summons, John also
received notice that in eight days his wages would be frozen in
the hands of his employer pending the outcome of the trial. As if
this were not enough, the next day the sheriff appeared and seized
John's color television and his expensive golf clubs, telling John
that this property would also be held pending trial, and that if John
should be found liable his wages and personal property could be
used to satisfy the judgment. Six months later John prevails in
court, at the same time gaining release of his wages and other
property. But in the interim he has been denied the use of his prop-
erty without an opportunity to prove that he, rather than the plain-
tiff, was in the right.
Attachment-an Extraordinary Remedy
Prejudgment attachment is the statutory remedy enabling a
plaintiff to seize and bring the defendant's property into legal cus-
tody pending trial on the plaintiff's claim.1 Prejudgment garnish-
ment is the process which enables the plaintiff prior to trial to freeze
in a third person's hands, property, money or credits belonging
to the defendant.' Garnishment is therefore an attachment of the
effects of the defendant in the garnishee's hands; the only significant
difference is that the creditor in garnishment proceedings does not
obtain a lien on the property garnished.3
This procedure dates back to early England,4 where its original
purpose was to compel the appearance of a defendant who had
failed to respond to judicial summons. The sheriff seized his prop-
erty, whether in his or a third person's hands, and forfeited it if
he again failed to appear in the action.'
1 Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Nay. Co., 211 U.S. 239, 245 (1908).
2 Kimball v. 'Richardson-Kimball Co., ill Cal. 386, 393, 43 P. 1111, 1112 (1896).
3 Id. at 393, 43 P. at 1112.
4 For a general historical review of the law of attachment, see 1 W. WADE,
ATTACHMENT & GARNISHMENT (1886).
5 "Foreign attachment is an incidental process against a defendant to a suit, who
has not appeared, having been summoned according to the course of the Court, to
compel his appearance. The only thing which makes such a custom reasonable at all
99
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The remedy of prejudgment attachment, in varying forms, has
been incorporated into the legal systems of all our jurisdictions.'
The various state statutes now in force have vastly extended and
liberalized the procedure, contrary to its historically limited pur-
pose. Many states authorize the remedy in cases where the resident
debtor is fraudulently concealing, removing or otherwise disposing
of his property with intent to defraud his creditors.7 Most states,
in line with the original purpose of the remedy, also authorize the
practice as a means of compelling the appearance of nonresident
defendants and others upon whom personal service of process can-
not be attained.8 California has extended the remedy over a much
wider field and seems to proceed upon a theory different from the
attachment laws of other jurisdictions. The original design of the
California attachment statute seems to have been not merely to
reach nonresident and absconding debtors or to circumvent fraud,
but to afford the creditor security for every demand not otherwise
secured, arising upon contract for the direct payment of money
made or payable in this state.9
Rationale for Prejudgment Attachment
The jurisdictions holding these liberalized attachment laws
constitutional advance the theory that the debtor in a prejudgment
is, that the Court which has jurisdiction over the defendant is, in substance,
by this custom, acting against the defendant alone, to compel his submission to that
jurisdiction. For this purpose it arrests or attaches his goods owing him within the
jurisdiction . . . ." The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London v. The London
Joint-Stock Bank, L.J. QUEEN'S BENCH NEW SERIES 594, 597 (1881).
6 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 104 (1921).
7 "One of the purposes of attachment is to .. .prevent the debtor's sequestration
of funds or fraudulent transfer of assets in an attempt to hinder or defeat the pay-
ment of just claims." American Ind. Sales Corp. v. Airscope, Inc., 44 Cal. 2d 393,
398, 282 P.2d 504, 507 (1955).
8 "[T]he debt is the property of the creditor, and because it is, the law seeks to
subject it ... to the payment of his creditors. If it can be done in any other way
than by process against and jurisdiction of his debtor, that way does not occur to us."
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710, 716 (1899); see
In Re Consolidated Container Carriers, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ; Han-
son v. Graham, 82 Cal. 631, 23 P. 56 (1890) ; Anderson v. Groff, 72 Cal. 65, 13 P.
73 (1887) ; Root v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App. 2d 242, 25 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1962).
9 It appears that our first attachment statute was "[Diesigned for the purpose
of securing the property of the debtor, to answer the judgment which may be ob-
tained." Low v. Adams, 6 Cal. 277, 281 (1856).
The original CALIFORNIA PRaCTICE ACT sec. 120 (The General Laws of the State
of California) read: "The Plaintiff, at the time of issuing his summons, or at any
time afterwards, may have the property of the defendant attached, as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment recovered. .. ."; see Myers v. Mott, 29 Cal. 359, 366
(1865) ; Schneider v. Zoeller, 175 Cal. App. 2d 354, 346 P.2d 515 (1959): "The pur-
pose of a writ of attachment is to effect a lien on the property of the defendant as
security for the payment of any judgment plaintiff may recover against him." Id.
at 358, 346 P.2d at 517. See also Crisman v. Dorsey, 12 Colo. 567, 21 P. 920 (1889) ;
Whinery v. Kozack, 216 Ind. 136, 22 N.E.2d 829 (1939); Lincoln Tavern v. Snader,
165 Ohio St. 61, 133 N.E.2d 606 (1956).
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attachment or garnishment situation is merely being temporarily
deprived of the full use of his property pending trial on the validity
of the creditor's underlying claim.' That because the taking is only
temporary and the debtor is afforded a full hearing prior to final
judgment, due process has been satisfied. Further, because of the
vast territorial expansion of the United States, the rapid means of
transportation that gives rise to population mobility, and the liberal
credit now available, these procedures are both necessary and
inevitable."
Judicial Response
The case of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation2 has,
however, opened the door to scrupulous judicial examination of
prejudgment attachment to determine whether due process is satis-
fied by this extraordinary remedy. In Sniadach, a creditor instituted
a prejudgment wage garnishment proceeding against his alleged
debtor, naming as garnishee the defendant's employer. Pursuant to
Wisconsin law, the creditor was able to freeze fifty percent of his
debtor's wages prior to a hearing on the validity of the underlying
claim. The debtor moved that the garnishment proceedings be dis-
missed for failure to comply with the notice and hearing require-
ments of the fourteenth amendment. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
sustained the lower court's finding that due process had been satis-
fied."3 On appeal the United States Supreme Court held the Wis-
consin statute invalid as a deprivation of property without due
process of law.14
The purpose of this comment is twofold: First, to discuss the
ramifications that the Sniadach case will have on California pre-
judgment attachment procedure as applied to situations where prop-
erty other than wages is being attached or garnished to afford the
creditor security for any judgment obtained. Second, to analyze the
effect Sniadach will have on California prejudgment wage garnish-
ment statutes in particular.
EFFECT OF SNIADACH ON CALIFORNIA PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT
Sniadach was a "garnishment" case. Yet garnishment differs 15
from attachment only as to the type of interest the plaintiff acquires
10 "The most that such a procedure does is to deprive defendant of the possession
of his property temporarily by establishing a lien thereon." Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va.
192, 196, 163 S.E. 845, 849, 81 A.L.R. 1213 (1932).
11 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 104 (1921).
12 89 S. Ct. 1820 (1969).
13 37 Wis. 2d 163, -, 154 N.W.2d 259, 265 (1968).
14 89 S. Ct. at 1823.
15 See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
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in the property prior to trial. Garnishment is but a form of attach-
ment. 16 Both practices in effect deprive a defendant of his property
pending trial. In the following discussion, Sniadack's "garnishment"
holding is applied to California's "attachment" practice, the assump-
tion being that the two practices, although different in procedure,
are one and the same in their effect. The hearing requirement of
the fourteenth amendment therefore applies equally to both.
Hearings and Due Process
In overturning the Wisconsin statute, the Sniadach Court
stressed the fact that attachments in general are summary in na-
ture. 17 Between the time the creditor, ex parte, initiates the proce-
dure whereby the defendant's property is seized and the time of trial
where the validity of the claim is tested, the debtor is effectively
deprived of the use of his property without being afforded an op-
portunity to present any defenses he may have to the plaintiff's
claim. A fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity
to be heard.18 But it is not in every case true that a person is con-
stitutionally guaranteed a hearing prior to the temporary taking of
property pending a later determination of the rights thereto. When
the necessities of the situation require immediate action, such a per-
son must yield to a more compelling interest and hence he is deemed
not to be deprived of his property without due process of law.19 Just
what situations show a "compelling interest" depend upon the cir-
cumstances of each case. 0 The Sniadach Court cited the cases of
Fahey v. Mallonee,21 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,22
Coffin Bros. v. Bennett," and Ownbey v. Morgan24 as examples of
extraordinary situations where the temporary taking of property did
not violate due process, stating that the circumstances of each case
16 Steineck v. Haas-Baruch Co., 106 Cal. App. 228, 231, 288 P. 1104, 1106
(1930); accord, FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940); Annot., 71 A.,L.R. 78 (1931).
'7 89 S. Ct. at 1821.
18 Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
'9 Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 520 (1944) ; cf. Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
20 "The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation . . . . [C]onsideration of what
procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin
with a determination of the precise nature of the governmental function involved
as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action."
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) ; see
Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944); Moyer v. Peabody, 212
U.S. 78, 84 (1919); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 288 (D. Colo. 1968).
21 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
22 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
28 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
24 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
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demonstrated those "compelling interests" which require that special
protection be given to a state or creditor interest.25
In Fahey, the Federal Home Loan Bank Administration had
named a conservator to take possession of a federal savings and loan
association prior to a hearing to determine the validity of the Ad-
ministration's charges of misconduct. The Court held this summaryprocedure valid on the ground that the impossibility of preserving
credit during an investigation would frustrate the interests of the
savers.
In Ewing, a national distributor of a food supplement suffered
eleven prehearing seizures of its product pursuant to a federal statute
and upon a claim by the government that the product was mis-branded. The Supreme Court found this procedure to be valid, stat-ing that the initial taking was merely the statutory prerequisite tothe bringing of a lawsuit and that the claimant had the right to a
full hearing before the court.
In Coffin, the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia statute authoriz-ing the Superintendent of Banks to issue executions against stock-holders of insolvent banks who, after notice from him, had neglected
to pay assessments on their stock. The defense based its objection
on the fact that this procedure was an execution and therefore the
creation of a lien at the beginning, before and without any judicialproceedings. But the Court noted that the stockholders were allowed
to raise and try every possible defense by an affidavit of illegality
which in fact made the so-called execution merely a mode of com-
mencing the suit to enforce their liability to depositors.
In Ownbey, a Delaware statute required a nonresident defen-dant in a foreign attachment action to give a surety's undertaking
to the value of the property attached as a condition to his right todefend the action. Relying on Pennoyer v. Neff28 the Ownbey Court
stated that "[T]he process of foreign attachment has its funda-
mental basis in the exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty of eachState over persons and property within its borders, 27 giving rise to
the authority and duty of a state to protect its own citizens in their
claims against nonresident owners of property located within the
state. 8
25 89 S. Ct. at 1821.
26 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
27 256 U.S. at 109.
28 "(A] property owner who absents himself from the territorial jurisdiction of
a State, leaving his property within it, must be deemed ex necessitate to consent thatthe State may subject such property to judicial process to answer demands madeagainst him in his absence, according to any practicable method that reasonably maybe adopted." Id. at 111.
1969)
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"Compelling Interest" and Attachment
The thrust of these cases appears to establish the rule that to
pass inspection under the due process clause, the creditor in an
attachment proceeding would be required to demonstrate a com-
pelling interest to protect the obligation owed him. Such would be
the case where the debtor is threatening to conceal, remove or other-
wise dispose of his property with intent to defraud his creditor, or
where the debtor is either a nonresident or for some other reason
not amenable to personal service of process. These situations cer-
tainly call for immediate action to eliminate the possibility of future
frustration to the creditor's interest in satisfying a judgment. How-
ever the California procedure, whereby the creditor can attach the
effects of his resident debtor merely for the purpose of providing
security for a later judgment,' 9 apparently fails to demonstrate such
a compelling interest requiring protection. The present state of the
California law is that a creditor does not have to show that his
interest in satisfying a future judgment is being threatened by ac-
tions of the debtor.30
The Supreme Court apparently analyzed this very proposition
in Sniadach:
But in the present case no situation requiring special protection to a
state or creditor interest is presented by the facts; nor is the Wisconsin
statute narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual condition. Petitioner
was a resident of this Wisconsin community and in personam jurisdic-
tion was readily obtainable. 31
Although this "compelling interest" requirement of Sniadach
is a prerequisite to summary procedure in its general use,
82 it is not
applicable to all summary attachment situations. The Sniadach
Court cites McKay v. McInnes3 for a procedural rule that satisfies
due process for attachments in general. In McKay, the plaintiff
brought an action to recover for services rendered his resident
debtor. The applicable Maine attachment statute authorized the
seizure of defendant's property without first filing an affidavit setting
out prima facie proof of good faith, filing a bond, or setting out
facts demonstrating a "compelling interest" requiring protection.
From the facts given it appeared that the plaintiff obtained personal
service on the defendant and was not being threatened by actions
of his debtor that would tend to frustrate his attempt to satisfy a
29 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 537 (West Supp. 1970).
30 See note 44 infra and accompanying text.
31 89 S. Ct. at 1821.
32 It was at least prerequisite to the Wisconsin statute.
83 279 U.S. 820 (1928).
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future judgment. The plaintiff then attached certain real and per-
sonal property of the defendant. Upon a claim by the defendant
that this procedure violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, the Maine Supreme Court8 4 stated:
But we think it is clear that the attachment statute does not de-
prive the defendant of due process of law.
An attachment creates a lien upon the estate which may be made
available to the creditor after judgment by a levy of the execution
thereon [citation omitted]. Its purpose is simply to secure to the cred-itor the property which the debtor has at the time it is made so that it
may be seized and levied upon in satisfaction of the debt after judg-
ment .... 35
Aside from a consideration of the nature of the property in-
volved, California Code of Civil Procedure section 537 nearly par-
allels that practice approved in McKay. Both allow attachment togive the plaintiff security for a future judgment and neither require
a showing by the plaintiff that his interest in satisfying his claim isbeing threatened by actions of the defendant. Hence, the SupremeCourt in Sniadach, having cited McKay approvingly, has apparently
approved California attachment from a procedural standpoint.
EFFECT OF SNIADACH ON
CALIFORNIA PREJUDGMENT WAGE GARNISHMENT
Pre-seizure Hearings
The Sniadack Court stressed the fact that wages have become
a unique type of property, a deprivation of which can cause tre-
mendous hardship on wage earners in our present economic system. 38
Because of this, a prejudgment wage garnishment procedure that inpractice substantially deprives a debtor of his means of family sup-
port, even temporarily, and does not afford the debtor an oppor-
tunity to be heard prior to the taking must fall as a violation of due
process.37
In Wisconsin the creditor could have a garnishee summonsissued,8" thereby commencing garnishment procedure any time after
the summons and complaint had been issued in the main action. 9
34 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd per curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1928). McKay
was affirmed on authority of Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) and Coffin
Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
35 127 Me. at-, 141 A. at 702 (emphasis added).
06 89 S. Ct. at 1822.
37 Id. at 1822-23.
38 WIs. STATS. ANN. § 267.04 (West Supp. 1965).
39 Id. § 267.02.
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Plaintiff in the garnishee summons was required to allege the exis-
tence of one of the grounds for garnishment required by statute,
the amount of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant above all
setoffs, and that the plaintiff believed that the named garnishee was
indebted to the defendant." After service of summons on the gar-
nishee, he was required to answer within twenty days, stating
whether he was indebted to the defendant. If so, he was required
to retain the property. 1 Within ten days after service of the com-
plaint upon the garnishee, notice of such service, or a copy of the
garnishee summons and complaint together with the summons in
the principal action, had to be served on the principal defendant
informing him that an action had been commenced against him and
that his wages had been garnished to satisfy the claim.
42
Thus the Wisconsin procedure allowed the plaintiff, ex parte,
to freeze the debtor's wages upon a showing merely that he had com-
menced an action permitting garnishment against the debtor and
believed the garnishee was indebted to the principal defendant.
In California, proceedings in garnishment are initiated at or
after the issuance of the summons in the principal action,
43 by filing
with the clerk of the court an affidavit showing that the plaintiff is
entitled to the writ. Recitals in the writ must establish one of the
statutory grounds upon which garnishment is authorized.
4 4 How-
ever it is not necessary for the affidavit to allege all facts necessary
to state a cause of action. The affidavit is not a true pleading, but
more in the nature of evidence.4 The writ of attachment
46 is then
directed to the sheriff,47 accompanied by information in writing
from the plaintiff or his attorney stating that the defendant's em-
ployer owes money to the defendant.48 The sheriff must then serve
upon such employer a copy of the writ of attachment and a notice
that the debt is attached. 9
Thus both the California and the former Wisconsin procedure
40 Id. § 267.05.
41 Id. § 267.08.
42 Id.
43 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 537 (West Supp. 1970).
44 Id. § 538. This section also requires the plaintiff to make averments showing
good faith in that the action is not being prosecuted to hinder, delay, or defraud any
creditor of the defendant, the amount of the demand being made by the plaintiff,
and a statement on information and belief that the defendant has not been adjudicated
a bankrupt. But the plaintiff need not allege that his interest in satisfying a future
judgment is being threatened by actions of the defendant.
45 Nichols v. Davis, 23 Cal. App. 67, 72, 137 P. 41, 43 (1913).
46 The term "garnishment" appears rarely in California statutes.
47 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 540 (West Supp. 1970).




allow garnishment proceedings to be initiated upon ex parte appli-
cation of the plaintiff in the principal action. Whereas the plaintiff
in California must file an affidavit showing the existence of an
alleged debt, the plaintiff in a Wisconsin garnishment action had
to make the same averments in his garnishment summons. The
practical result is the same. The debtor has not been afforded the
opportunity to contest the validity of the alleged debt.50 The con-
sequences which follow such procedure are obvious. By the time
the debtor is served with summons in the principal action, the
machinery to freeze his wages is in motion and he has been denied
"[A]ny opportunity to be heard and to tender any defense he may
have, whether it be fraud or otherwise."'"
Obviously the manner of initially starting garnishment pro-
ceedings in California is in no material way dissimilar from that
procedure which was struck down in Wisconsin. Neither provide
for a hearing of any kind prior to the initial taking.
Financial Hardship
In Sniadack, the fact that the Wisconsin procedure placed the
wage earner in serious financial trouble, prior to trial on the validity
of the creditor's claim, was the dominating factor in holding the
statute invalid. 2 The financial burden placed on the defendant in a
wage garnishment action in California is not unlike that burden
placed on the defendant in Sniadach. The discussion which follows
suggests that such burden exists in California.
Exemptions
California Code of Civil Procedure section 690.1113 limits the
amount of wages which can be garnished. Pursuant to this section,
one-half of a defendant's wages are automatically exempt from
levy. Moreover, if the debtor can show that the remaining one-half
is needed for the support of his family, and that the debt sued
upon was not incurred for the common necessaries of life or for
50 "What we know from our study of this problem [of prejudgment wage
garnishment] is that in a vast number of cases the debt is a fraudulent one . .. ."
114 CONG. REC. H 688 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1968) [remarks of Congressman Sullivan
during debate on the proposed Consumer 'Credit Protection Act (H.R. 11601, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968)) ].
51 89 S. Ct. at 1821.
52 "[T]he statutory exemption granted the wage earner is 'generally insufficient
to support the debtor for any one week.'
"The result is that a prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type may as
a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall." Id. at 1822-23.
53 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 690.11 (West Supp. 1970).
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personal services rendered by an employee of the debtor, all his
earnings can be exempt. But as a practical matter section 690.11
serves only to exempt the first half of the debtor's wage.
For the plaintiff to be able to reach the one-half of the wages
that is not automatically exempt he must merely allege in his affi-
davit for attachment that the action is brought to collect a debt
incurred for the common necessaries of life.54 If the debtor then
seeks to challenge this averment he must file an exemption affidavit
stating the code section or sections upon which he is relying for his
claim or exemption "[A]nd all facts necessary to support his
claim . . . ."55 Upon the filing of the exemption affidavit by the
debtor, the creditor may then file a counter-affidavit.5 6 Within five
days either party may then move to have the exemption claim heard
in court.57 The hearing takes place fifteen days after the motion.58
At the hearing the burden of proof is on the debtor to show both
that the remaining one-half of his wages is needed for the support
of his family, and that the debt was not incurred for common neces-
saries of life.59 As a result of this procedural tangle, that can take
as long as twenty-five days, most debtors in reality receive only
the one-half of their wages that is automatically exempt. For ex-
ample, during the month of February, 1965, the Sheriff of San
Francisco levied 1781 attachments and executions but received only
52 exemption claims.6° Further, during the months of January, April
and July, 1967, there were 337 actions filed in the Municipal Court
for the San Jose-Milpitas-Alviso Judicial District of Santa Clara
County, California, in which property of various types was attached
or garnished, but there were only seven (or two percent of the 337)
exemption claims filed and only one was fully allowed.6
In most cases in California, this loss of one-half of a debtor's
54 Id. § 538.
55 Id. § 690.26 (1).
56 Id. § 690.26 (3).
57 Id. § 690.26 (5).
58 Id.
59 Id. § 690.26 (9).
60 Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recommendations, 53
CALrF. L. REV. 1214, 1217 (1965).
Further, a debtor is subject to weekly levies on his wages: "Several writs may
issue upon the same affidavit and undertaking simultaneously or from time to time
within 60 days after the filing of the affidavit and undertaking . . . whether or not
any writ previously issued has been returned." 'CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 540 (West
1967) (emphasis added). "This is and can be a very vicious practice. . . .This can
really kill a man. He doesn't have a chance." Assembly Interim Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, Proceedings on Attachments 49-50 (June 23, 1964).
61 R. Such, A Survey of Attachment, Preliminary Report, Nov. 10, 1968 (un-




wages pending trial must surely disrupt whatever budget he is rely-
ing on for relative financial security. Recent studies have substan-
tiated this proposition."2 The conclusion follows that California wage
garnishment practice does not appear to afford the debtor any
greater basic financial security prior to a determination of rights
at trial than did the Wisconsin statute which was invalidated in
Sniadach.
Hearings Prior to Trial
The Sniadach Court found that "[w] here the taking of one's
property is so obvious ... ." a hearing prior to the taking must be
afforded to satisfy the fundamental requirements of due process.63
The Wisconsin procedure did not afford the debtor a statutory right
to a hearing prior to the trial. 4 And it was not sufficient that case
law did allow a limited review of the propriety of the garnishment.
But far from being a hearing on the merits of the creditor's claim,
this limited hearing examined only the mechanics of bringing the
action, that is, whether or not the plaintiff had complied with the
procedural requirements of stating a cause of action for damages
founded upon contract. 5 This lack of an adversary hearing on the
merits prior to trial is also present in California practice.
Motion to Discharge Attachment
By statute the California debtor may, on motion, apply for
discharge of the writ of garnishment on the ground that it was im-
62 In his comprehensive coverage of wage garnishment in California, supra note
60, George Brunn estimates the family budget for an employee with three dependents
is $6,859 a year in San Francisco and $6,882 in Los Angeles. "This budget is designed
to maintain a family at a 'modest but adequate' standard of living." 53 CALIF. L.
REV. at 1217. Brunn further states that during March 1965 average income in the
manufacturing industry was $6,784 per year in San Francisco and $6,207 per year in
Los Angeles.
That the majority of wage garnishments are directed at the "poor" man who must
maintain a week to week existence is not seriously contested: "While precise data are
lacking, wage garnishment is probably predominantly used against debtors in the
low-to-middle-income groups; 'garnishee' is one word that is better known among
the poor than among those who are economically well off." Brunn, supra at 1229.
It is clear that a debtor in California who loses even one-half of his weekly wages
will face serious economic hardship.
For excellent coverage of the problems wage earners face when experiencing wage
garnishment see Comment, Wage Garnishment in Washington-an Empirical Study,
43 WASH. 'L. REV. 742 (1968) ; Comment, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device,
1967 Wis. L. REV. 759; THE LAW AND TH'E Low INCOmE CoNsumER, project on Social
Welfare Law Supplement, No. 2 (1968).
63 89 S. Ct. at 1823.
64 "No trial shall be had of the garnishment action until the plaintiff has judg-
ment in the principal action . . . ." WIs. STATS. ANN. § 267.16 (1) (West Supp. 1965).
65 Orton v. Noonan, 27 Wis. 572 (1871); Chernin v. International Oil Co., 261
Wis. 308, 52 N.W.2d 783 (1952).
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properly or irregularly issued.6 If the writ is issued in a case pro-
vided by statute67 it is considered "properly" issued. 8 And if the
statutory requirements as to the manner of its issuance are com-
plied with, the writ is considered "regularly" issued. The result
is that the motion to discharge the garnishment prior to trial cannot
be used to try the merits of the action itself. In the case of Repub-
lic Truck Sales Corporation v. Peak,70 the defendant moved that an
attachment be discharged on the ground that he was not in fact
indebted to the plaintiff. In so doing, the defendant in effect at-
tempted to try the question of his liability to the plaintiff and to
examine the validity of the claim sued upon. The court stated that
a motion to discharge an attachment may not be turned into a trial
on the merits of the case itself .71 These issues must await determina-
tion from the pleadings and evidence presented in the main action.72
The result is that a defendant is not afforded an opportunity, prior
to trial, to present any defense to the plaintiff's claim in order to
obtain release of his wages. Therefore the California prejudgment
wage garnishment procedure differs in no material degree from
the one struck down in Sniadach and must be considered in viola-
tion of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
CONCLUSION
The law of prejudgment attachment as practiced in California
is a harsh and drastic remedy. It favors the creditor, allowing him
to attach the effects of his debtor for the mere purpose of securing
such property for a possible future judgment. The case of Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corporation has penetrated this practice to a
limited extent, holding that the prejudgment garnishment (which is
in substance not unlike attachment) of wages without a hearing
on the validity of the plaintiff's underlying claim is a deprivation
of property without due process of law. In California a debtor in
a wage garnishment case does not have the opportunity to contest
the validity of his creditor's claim either before the garnishment
is levied or before trial, but must await formal litigation to present
any defenses he may have. He is thus deprived of his wages tern-
66 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 556 (West 1954).
67 Id. § 537.
68 Landry v. Marshall, 243 Cal. App. 2d 170, 52 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1966).
(9 Kohler v. Agassiz, 99 Cal. 9, 33 P. 741 (1893); Challenge Cream & Butter
Ass'n v. Royal Dutch Dairies, 212 Cal. App. 2d 901, 28 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1963).
70 194 Cal. 492, 229 P. 331 (1924).
1 Id. at 503, 229 P. at 335; accord, Minor v. Minor, 175 Cal. App. 2d 277, 345
P.2d 954 (1959).
72 Challenge Cream & Butter Ass'n v. Royal Dutch Dairies, 212 Cal. App. 2d 901,
908, 28 Cal. Rptr, 448, 452 (1963),
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porarily without a hearing. In light of Sniadach this practice must
now be considered unconstitutional.
Sniadach, however, appears on its face to be limited to those
situations where wages, or their equivalent, are the subject of the
action. Being of a special nature, wages present unusual problems
in our economic system. Thus to extend Sniadach to other situations
it appears that there must be a showing that the property subject
to deprivation has special characteristics, a taking of which will
cause undue hardship to the debtor.
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